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There has been a world-wide trend towards decentralisation since the 1990s.  
Many countries have  embarked on the devolution of administrative, political, and 
fiscal responsibilities to lower levels of government.  Dissatisfaction with the 
prevailing centralised systems of service delivery, transition from centralised planning 
to market economy, deepening democratic principles, focus on ensuring greater 
accountability and increasing need to recognise social, economic, and political 
diversities in different regions within the countries are some of the important reasons 
cited for this phenomenon.  This trend towards decentralisation is seen in countries 
with federal as  also with unitary systems; it has spanned across countries with 
varying levels of development; it is seen as much in transitional countries and even 
military dictatorships as in democratic countries (Litvack, Ahmad and Bird, 1998). 
     
One of the principal motivations for decentralising of political, administrative 
and fiscal systems in developing countries  is the belief that this will help to catalyse 
the process of  harnessing the developmental potential  and improve the living 
conditions of the people, particularly, the disadvantaged sections.  By ‘development’, 
we do not merely mean in the narrow sense of increasing per capita incomes, but in 
the broader sense of expanding the real freedoms of the people.  This requires 
“removal of  various sources of unfreedom: poverty as well tyranny, poor economic 
opportunities as well as systematic social deprivation, neglect of public facilities as 
well as intolerance or over-activity of repressive states” (Sen, 1999; p. 3)  
  
The  first generation theories argue that decentralisation results in efficiency 
gains by matching of public services with diversified preferences of the people.  The 
second generation theories advocate decentralisation as it enhances  responsiveness 
and  accountability.  It is also argued that decentralised public service delivery 
enhances competition and productivity in public services.  Participatory planning at 
decentralised levels is supposed to create conditions for inclusive growth.  In short, 
decentralisation is seen as a responsive and participatory governance system, a 
catalyst for accelerating growth and alleviating poverty and enabler for the pursuit of a 
variety of other developmental objectives including human development. Seen in this  
wider perspective, decentralisation is not only a means to expand political, social and 
economic freedoms of the people, but also as  enabler of wider choice and freedom in 
the pursuit of development and therefore, an end in itself.  The critical issue is to what 
extent efforts to decentralise the political, administrative and fiscal systems have 
actually helped the people, particularly the disadvantaged sections to exercise wider 
choices and experience freedom.   
 
Whether decentralisation  contributes to  development or not has been an 
issue of considerable debate in the literature and positions have been taken based on 
the  individual  scholar’s  predisposition and  belief rather than  on sound theory or 
empirical evidence.  Many  scholars assert inherent merit in decentralisation; it is 
considered to be a constituent of well being and therefore, an end in itself.  
Participation of the people in the governments closest to them is supposed to 
empower them to make decisions on governance as well as in  public service delivery.    6 
 
However, actual empowerment depends on the extent of effective participation.  
Decentralisation is also seen as an important means to enable efficient allocation of 
resources, improve governance, accelerate economic growth, reduce poverty, 
achieve greater gender equity, and empower  the  weaker sections of society.    In 
contrast, arguments against  it are that it  weakens the capacity of  central 
governments to undertake macroeconomic stabilisation, that there are efficiency 
losses due to poor administrative capacity of local governments to undertake the 
functions assigned to them and  there is  potential for increased corruption 
(Prud’homme, 1995 Tanzi, 1996, 2001).  After reviewing several empirical studies 
Martinez-Vazquez Jorge and McNab ( 2003; p. 1608) conclude, “ …..(O)ur knowledge 
of how decentralization affects growth is too limited at the present time to allow us to 
proffer advice. (T)he dynamic superiority of decentralized over centralized public 
expenditures is by no means obvious.”  
   
In Indian context, however, the issue is not whether or not decentralisation 
leads to development, but  on whether decentralisation makes local governments 
catalysts  of  development.  The 73
rd and 74
th  constitutional amendments have 
asserted that decentralisation strategy is imperative for inclusive development of the 
country.  Despite this, many of the states are yet to complete the process of devolving 
powers to the panchayats and in many others, there is hardly  any worthwhile 
participation of the people in the decision making process in panchayats.  Therefore, 
the question is not whether decentralisation leads to development or otherwise, but 
how policy and institutional reforms can be designed and implemented to make the 
panchayats effective catalysts in the developmental process in rural areas.  This has 
to be done by drawing lessons – both positive and negative, from the decentralisation 
experiences. 
   
The  objective  of this  study is to review  the analytical literature on the 
relationship between decentralisation and development,  bring out the  impact of 
decentralisation on economic development from experiences both within the country 
and worldwide, and identify the preconditions and reforms needed to strengthen and 
deepen the panchayat system to make them catalysts  of development in India.   
 
 




  The  arguments  for decentralisation  are  advanced  on political as well as 
econom ic grounds.  The political reasoning for decentralisation is that it takes the 
governments closer to the people and makes them participate in decision making.  It 
is argued that participatory governance empowers people to participate productively 
in the market and ensures inclusive development and therefore, it is an end in itself.  
Thus, inclusive governance contributes to inclusive  development and decentralisation 
is a necessary pre-requisite for inclusive governance.  Decentralisation enables the 
people, particularly the vulnerable sections to increase their capabilities, participate 
productively in the market and earn their freedoms (Sen, 1999).  
   
The economic argument for decentralisation is founded on efficiency gains 
from public service delivery.  The first generation theories, assuming a benevolent 
State, demonstrate that decentralisation enables delivery of public services according 
to diversified preferences of the people and therefore, results in welfare gains.  The   7 
 
“decentralisation theorem” which typifies the first generation theories states, “….in the 
absence of cost savings from the centralised provision of a (local public) good and of 
inter-jurisdictional externalities, the level of welfare will always be at least as high 
(and typically higher) if Pareto-efficient levels of consumption are provided in each 
jurisdiction than any single, uniform level of consumption is maintained across all 
jurisdictions” (italics added; Oates, 1972, p. 54).    
 
The efficacy of a decentralised system in improving governance, achieving 
empowerment, enhancing efficiency in service delivery and impacting on growth and 
poverty depends on the nature of the institutions and more particularly the power 
structure in local areas.  In the literature, the economic argument for decentralisation 
is rooted in the premise that it will enhance efficiency.  Decentralisation enables a 
wider choice and ensures better matching of public service – tax bundles with the 
preferences of people.  The mechanisms to exercise the choice can be exercised 
either by ‘exit’ (Tiebout, 1956) or by ‘voice’ (Oates, 1999).  However, the welfare 
enhancing argument for decentralisation is rooted in the ‘common good’ doctrine in 
which social welfare is maximised by an organicist state or a benevolent dictator.  I n 
contrast, in the world in which different agents of the government are motivated by 
self interest, the oligopolistic power structure can result in bureaucratic, political elite 
or interest group capture (Bret on, 1996, Bardhan, 2003). 
  
The second  generation theories (SGT), do not assume a benevolent  state; 
they take that agents within the governments (bureaucrats and politicians) have their 
own objective functions operating within the constellation of incentives and 
constraints depending on the given fiscal and political institutions (Oates, 2008).  The 
SGT theorists highlight the advantage of decentralisation in enhancing greater 
accountability to people, with the trade off being in terms of lowered coordination in 
policies to internalise spillovers.  From the viewpoint of developmental implications of 
decentralisation,  application of Kornai’s (1986) analysis of  ‘soft budget constraint’ , 
originally developed in the context of state enterprises in socialist economies provides 
useful insights.  The analysis takes its motivation from the fiscal crisis precipitated by 
exploitation of “fiscal commons” leading to perverse behaviour of subnational 
governments in Latin America.  The model argues that decentralisation can lead to 
the exploitation of fiscal commons resulting in soft budget constraints and this would 
impede rather than promote development.  Ensuring hard budget constraint  is 
essential for  Market Promoting Federalism (MPF) and this  requires that important 
sources of soft budget constraints for subnational governments in various countries 
are avoided. These are (i) ill defined responsibilities to units and functionaries; (ii) 
federal transfers; (iii) borrowing and bail outs; (iv)  absence of a strong system of 
private markets (land, capital); and (v) history and precedents (Weingast, 2009).  
  
In much of the literature on decentralisation, there is no clear causal linkage 
established between decentralisation and economic growth (Martinez-Vazquez and 
Mcnab, 2003).  Of course, theoretical arguments for decentralisation were advanced 
in terms of efficiency in resource allocation, preservation and development of markets, 
increased participation of people in policies and hence, inclusive governance and 
responsive public service delivery.   The traditional argument for decentralisation is 
that it provides greater choice to the people to match public service provision with 
their preferences by either “exit” (Tiebout, 1967)) or voice (Oates, 1972).  The 
resulting efficient allocation of resources enhances welfare.  The extensions of these 
arguments are in terms of increased participation of the people in decision making 
and responsiveness of the governments.   Much of the mainstream literature on fiscal 
federalism, as reviewed in the previous section, arrives at this conclusion.    8 
 
A more advanced argument for increased efficiency  is that of “laboratory 
federalism” .  In this, decentralisation  is perceived as  providing a congenial 
environment for development by enabling experimentation with new policies and 
methods of delivering public services.  As stated by Justice Louis Brandeis in 1932, 
“….It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous 
State may, if its citizens choose  to serve as a laboratory, they try novel social and 
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country” (quoted in Osborne, 
1988).  Laboratory federalism can work in a variety of ways.  In some the higher level 
government may provide the general framework within which the decentralised 
governments can introduce their own programmes.  Alternatively, the initiative for 
new policies may actually come from the decentralised governments. 
 
The link between decentralisation and development comes stronger in the 
formulation on ‘competitive federalism’.  Breton (1995, 2006) and Salmon (1987, 
2006) provide a more systematic analysis of vertical and horizontal competition to 
conclude increased efficiency under decentralisation.  Pierre Salmon’s analysis of 
horizontal competition shows that citizens of a jurisdiction can use information about 
the public services provided elsewhere to evaluate the performance of their own 
governments, in the manner of a rank order tournament.
1  Therefore, competition 
among governments not only affects policies to attract or keep citizens happy, but 
also interacts with electoral incentives.  Accordingly, “[e]ach government has an 
incentive to do better than governments in other jurisdictions in terms of levels and 
qualities of services, of levels of taxes or of more general economic and social 
indicators.”  Empirically, whether this happens or not (and this is a question that 
needs to be examined in the Indian context) depends on “the possibility and 
willingness of citizens to make assessments of comparative performance...and [on] 
the impact these assessments have on the well-being of politicians” (Salmon, 1987, p. 
32).  Breton (1995, p. 237) argues that the “Salmon incentive mechanism” is an 
essential pre-requisite for competitive governments and is quite important in 
understanding the diffusion of policies and program mes among jurisdictions in 
federations.  While analytically this formulation brings in additional insights, there are 
questions about its applicability in developing countries such as, India.  More 
importantly, the preconditions required for healthy intergovernmental competition 
such as the existence of a well functioning democracy, people’s participation in 
governmental policies and elections being fought on issues relating to policies and 
public service deliveries may not simply exist in many developing countries. 
  
In contrast to the above, there is  a strand of  literature that  argues that 
decentralisation actually impedes rather than promotes development for three 
important reasons.  First, decentralisation adds to the coordination problem 
particularly in ensuring macroeconomic stabilisation (Tanzi, 1986, 2002). Second, 
Prod’homme (1985) argues that in developing and transitional countries, subnational 
governments impede development  due to their  lower capacity to deliver public 
services.  Finally, Prod’homme asserts that local politicians and officials are more 
corrupt.  Yet another strand of literature taking the example of the experience in Latin 
America focuses on the exploitation of  “fiscal commons” by subnational governments  
leading to their perverse behaviour.  The model argues that decentralisation can lead 
to the exploitation of fiscal commons resulting in soft budget constraints and this 
                                                  
1In general incentive models, incentives are not perfect from the principal’s point of view 
because the performance of the agent (here the government) is subject to noise.  Hence 
performance is not a perfect indicator of effort.  Relative performance can help to reduce this 
noise in evaluating effort: see, Milgrom and Roberts (1990), chapter 7.   9 
 
would impede rather than promote development (McKinnon, 1997, Weingast, 1995).  
Another potential adverse effect of decentralisation on development arises when the 
local officials, even if they are elected in a democratic process are a part of the local 
elite or are subservient to local elite.  Such an ‘elite capture’ can create a series of 
problems including exaggeration of cost of providing local public goods, poor quality 
of local public goods provided, corruption, and diversion of the local public goods to 
non-intended groups (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 1998, 1999).  
  
Unfortunately, there are no analytical bases for these assertions and one can 
easily make counter-arguments for each of the above arguments.  First, corruption is 
not a prerogative of only local government officials and it is not certain whether local 
corruption is more harmful on development than central corruption.  It can also be 
argued that at higher levels of government, the values of contracts are much more, 
and therefore the scope for corruption is much higher.  Ultimately, this is an empirical 
issue.  Second, low capacity of local governments is a case for taking initiatives to 
develop the capacity and not an argument against decentralisation.  Finally, the elite 
capture of public services at local levels depends on the power structure and again, it 
is not an issue of centralisation versus decentralisation, but one of  ensuring a well 
functioning democracy with active participation of the people.  Capture by special 
interest groups can happen at the central level as well.  
 
Thus,  as argued by Bardhan and Mookherjee (2007),  effectiveness of 
decentralisation as a developmental catalyst  is context and design specific.  The 
context of decentralisation depends on factors such as the  nature of devolution, 
extent of people’s participation in decision making, educational, social and economic 
status of people within the local government and the nature and extent of information 
dissemination including the existence of active media.  The design of decentralisation 
determines the extent of devolution of powers and sources of finance and  clarity in 
assignments of functions and sources of finance.  The design of decentralisation also 
determines permanency or inextinguishability of assignments either in the constitution 
or  through conventions.  It also determines the powers and capacity of  the local 
officials to undertake their assigned responsibilities, the degree of transparency, the 
mechanism and extent of information dissemination and oversight and checks and 
balances to enforce the above (Bardhan and Mookerjee, 2007).   
 
The issue of decentralisation and development, thus,  brils  down to 
appropriately designing the decentralisation reform in a given context, which again, 
does not remain  static.  This implies that as the context changes, it may be necessary 
for the design to be changed.  In spite of these complexities, an understanding of 
both contextual and design factors that make decentralisation work and act as a 
catalyst in economic development would help in calibrating decentralisation reforms. 
 
 




Much of the empirical literature examining the impact of decentralisation on 
economic well  being considers the  direct and indirect  relationship  between 
decentralisation and economic growth or its components.  Most studies examine the 
relationship  between decentralisation and development  essentially  by regressing 
economic growth on various measures of fiscal decentralisation.  Oates (1972) in one   10 
 
of the earliest studies taking a sample of 58 countries found the measures of fis cal 
centralisation had significant and negative correlation with per capita real income.  
However, it was not clear whether decentralisation is a “cause” or a “result” of 
economic growth.   
 
Subsequently, there have been a number of cross-section as well as time -
series  studies regressing economic growth on some measure of fiscal 
decentralisation, but the results have been mixed.   Zhang and Zou find that different 
measures of fiscal decentralisation in India have positive and sometimes significant 
effect on economic growth.  Apart from econometric problems of specification, the 
study refers to decentralisation only up to the state level.  Lin and Liu (2000) show a 
positive and significant relationship between decentralisation and economic growth in 
China.  Thiessen (2000) finds a similar relationship for panels of high income, West 
European and middle income countries.  In contrast,  negative association between 
fiscal decentralisation and economic growth is shown by Zhang and Zou (1998) in the 
case of China, Davoodi, Xia and Zou (1998) for the United States.  Martinez-Vazquez 
and MacNab (2002) on the other hand, fail to find a statistically significant and robust 
relationship between fiscal decentralisation and economic growth for developing 
countries.  Thus, empirical studies have failed to establish a clear causal relationship 
between decentralisation and economic growth.   
 
However, t here are a number of conceptual and methodological problems 
with these empirical studies.  First, the measurement of fiscal decentralisation is 
beset with innumerable  difficulties.  There is no single best measure of 
decentralisation (Bird, 1986).  Indeed decentralisation is a multi-dimensional concept 
and using a single dimension variable in an econometric study is not likely to capture 
the overall effect.  Second, economic growth is determined by a number of factors 
such as effective governance, economic freedom, savings rate, investment behaviour, 
human capital and technological progress.   Exclusion of these  variables in the 
estimating equations could result in the omitted variable bias.   In other words, when 
fiscal decentralisation is seen to be a significant factor determining economic growth, 
it may simply be because it is capturing the effect of some other variables that might 
be, in reality having a greater effect.  Conversely when it is not seen to be significant, 
it may be that other factors  are obscuring the effect of fiscal decentralisation.  The 
results of such studies are simply not robust enough to draw any clear conclusions.  
Third, there is a serious problem of bi-directional causality between fiscal 
decentralisation and economic growth in most of the estimates.  Fiscal 
decentralisation impacts on economic growth and vice versa and when both the 
variables are endogenous, this must be controlled by including a variable which is 
correlated with decentralisation, but uncorrelated with growth.  Further, it is not 
correct to assume that the relationship between decentralisation and growth is 
contemporaneous.  In reality, they work with lags and identifying appropriate lags is 
not easy.   Fourth, given that theoretical literature on the causal relationship between 
decentralisation and economic growth is inconclusive, there is a danger of accepting 
the results when the correlations are statistically significant, and these may simply be 
spurious (Martinez-Vasquez and McNab, 2003).  Finally, even when all the above 
problems are taken account of, if negative relationship between decentralisation and 
growth is observed, that does not necessarily imply that decentralisation impedes 
economic growth.  It may simply be that  the country  concerned has crossed the 
optimum levels of decentralisation. If indeed, multidimensional measures  of 
decentralisation are chosen, there can actually be multiple optima of decentralisation.  
      11 
 
The  results of  empirical studies  on the impact of decentralisation on work 
effort, saving and investment,  production efficiency as well as  matching of 
preferences too are unreliable due to the problems of specification and measurement 
of decentralisation variable.  In particular, as mentioned above, these studies suffer 
from omitted variable bias, the problem of spurious correlations, bidirectional 
causality and proper identification of time-lags (Martinez-Vazquez and McNab, 2003).  
The  only conclusion that  can be drawn from the review of these studies is that our 
current knowledge of the impact of decentralisation on economic growth is too limited 
to make any generalisations.  
  
  As mentioned earlier, the traditional argument for decentralisation is that it 
enhances efficiency.  Efficiency can be in terms of enhancing the welfare of the 
people  by enhancing the scope  of providing public services to match their 
preferences (i.e.,  “consumer efficiency”) or better efficiency in the supply of public 
services (i.e.,  “producer efficiency”). Of course, there is a predominant belief that 
decentralisation can lead to greater consumer efficiency, because in much of the 
analyses, there is a priori belief that decentralised systems are more responsive.  
There is also a belief that the  central government cannot vary public services 
according to the preferences of different localities , or if it can  so  provide, the 
information cost to enable the same is too prohibitive.  There are hardly any empirical 
studies on the impact of decentralisation on consumer efficiency.    Similarly, it is 
believed that appropriately structured decentralisation can improve resource 
allocation and help in pushing the production frontier through market preservation, 
competition, experimentation and innovation, but there are no empirical studies to 
substantiate this. 
 
  Another set of empirical studies  focus on whether decentralisation leads to 
the  creation of enabling conditions for development.  This  approach has merit 
because, development is caused by a number of exogenous factors and it is difficult 
to tease out the contribution of the  decentralisation variable; whereas on the other 
hand, the favourable conditions created by decentralisation can be easily identified.  
Faguet (2004) analysed  the impact of decentralisation reform in Bolivia in altering the 
prevailing investment patterns.  The country was highly centralised on the eve of the 
nationalist revolution in 1952 and continued to be so as it followed  a  dirigistic 
industrialisation strategy until it embarked on a major decentralisation reform in 1994.  
The reform led to increase in the tax devolution to the local governments from 10 per 
cent of the  central government revenue to 20 per cent, assignment of the 
responsibility  for the provision of major social and physical infrastructure such as 
education, culture, sports, local roads, and irrigation to the municipalities, 
establishment of oversight committees legally distinct from the municipal 
governments comprising of representatives from grass-roots groups within each 
municipality to oversee municipal spending and restructuring of the municipalities by 
creating 198 new municipalities (which comprised of 64 per cent of the total number) 
and expanding the existing ones to include suburbs and surrounding rural areas. 
Based on econometric analysis, Faguet (2004; p. 30) concluded, “….decentralisation 
significantly changed national public investment patterns. Investment changed 
unambiguously in education, water and sanitation, water management, agriculture, 
and urban development after 1994 reform, and there is some evidence that it may 
have changed in health, transport, communication and industry and tourism as well.  
Furthermore, these changes are strongly and positively related to real local needs”. 
  
The experience in Columbia too showed that decentralisation led to fivefold 
increase in municipal investments without increasing the running costs  (Faguet,   12 
 
2005).  However, Faguet argues that decentralisation is not a panacea for all ills, as 
he f ound that  participatory decision making in Bolivia was more restricted than in 
Columbia.  Faguet  draws a number of lessons from the experiences of the two 
countries, namely, that (i) democracy and decentralisation are deeply 
complementary; (ii) in order for decentralisation to work well, sub-national 
governments must face hard budget constraints.  In Columbia for example, the 
problem of soft budget constraints led to serious macroeconomic stability problems; 
(iii) it is important to have significant revenue raising powers at sub-national levels for 
decentralisation to succeed; (iv) decentralisation is not a policy package, but a 
dynamic process that is constantly evolving; and (vi) institutional history is important; 
the impact of a decentralisation reform depends on the character of decentralisation 
prior to the reform.   
 
  Habibi  et.al (2003) analysed the impact of decentralisation on human 
development in Argentina.  Human development was measured by infant mortality 
rate and the ratio of enrolment in secondary schools to primary students.  The impact 
was estimated by regressing  the  two human development variables on various 
exogenous variables, including two decentralisation variables, using the panel data of 
23 provinces over the period 1970-94. The decentralisation variables were measured 
in terms of (i) the share of funds controlled by the provinces; and (ii)  the share of 
taxes raised by the provinces in  the total provincial revenues.  Other  exogenous 
variables included were provincial per capita expenditures, total expenditure, number 
of public employees per 1000 persons and the ratio of royalties to controlled 
revenues and ratio of conditional transfers to provisional revenues regressed on 
health and education variables .  The result s showed that the coefficients of the two 
decentralisation variables consistently had negative and significant impact on infant 
mortality rate and positive and significant impact on education.  These results, 
however, must be viewed with scepticism because of several econometric problems 
with the model – both the choice of variables, measurement of decentralisation, 
specification of the model and not accounting for time-wide causality (lags).  Besides, 
the analysis is too aggregative; as it is confined only up to the regional (provincial) 
level.  In view of these problems, these results must be viewed with scepticism.  
 
Bardhan and Mookherjee (2007) have compiled a series of studies analysing 
the impact of decentralisation in a number of countries to bring out very useful 
insights.  Baiocchi (2007)  traces the historical evolution of decentralisation in Brazil 
and argues that the 1988 constitution was influenced by pressures from a wide range 
of groups including regional and social movements and international agencies.  The 
constitution devolved greater political and fiscal autonomy to the local governments 
and the share of tax revenues of local governments increased from 11 to 13 per cent 
between 1987 and 1991. The paper shows that public services showed a substantial 
increase since the late 1980s and the disparity  in services  between regions 
substantially decreased.  Similarly, infant mortality and life expectancy increased after 
decentralisation reforms.  Baiocchi argues that decentralisation created a space for 
local governments to introduce innovations such as participatory budgeting.  The 
experiment in the local government of Porto Allegre has substantially improved public 
service delivery and this was diffused to other local governments, though result were 
uneven and  the success depended upon the acceptance by  the civil society. 
 
  The big bang decentralisation in Indonesia initiated after the fall of  the 
Suharto regime in 1988 devolved responsibility for  delivering health, education, 
infrastructure and environmental services to local governments.  The reform also 
entailed the transfer of 2/3
rd of civil services from the  centre to local governments,   13 
 
though the latter did not have the autonomy to hire or fire them.  Based on their 
survey, Hofman and Kaiser (2007) found that there were significant improvements in 
local service delivery and satisfactory ratings for local civil services.  These ratings 
were higher than those supplied by the centre.  They also recorded that high levels of 
corruption continue to persist both at the district and village levels. 
 
  Chaudhuri’s (2007)  analysis of Indian decentralisation following the 73
rd and 
74
th Amendments brings out that reform was incremental rather than radical and was  
aimed at e liminating the shortcomings of the previous regime.  In his view, the 
extension of fiscal and functional devolution was low and state bureaucrats continued 
to retain control in most of the states even after the constitutional amendments.  He 
also records that the participation in village meetings (gram sabhas) has been sparse 
except in a few states.  He shows that indices of devolution were uncorrelated with 
alternative indicators of economic performance of human development. 
 
  West Bengal is one of the states in India that implemented decentralisation 
much more effectively after the 73
rd Amendment of the Constitution in 1992.  The 
analysis of the impact of the various measures taken to broaden and deepen the 
decentralisation reform by Bardhan and Mookherjee (2007) shows that even though 
about  2/3
rd of the local government positions were taken by landless, small and 
marginal farmers, they were under-represented as  their population weight was 96 per 
cent.  The study argues that there is considerable responsiveness and accountability 
in the pattern of resource allocation in villages.  The analysis also shows the state 
reservation for women enhances the participation of women in village council 
meetings.  They show that reservation for women for chairpersons in the panchayats 
resulted in significant shifting of public spending from informal education centres to 
drinking water facilities and road maintenance.   The analysis also shows that the bulk 
of the resources for welfare programmes flowed to poorer sections.  There is also 
sufficient evidence of the influence wielded by large and medium land owners, 
particularly in inter-village allocations (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2007; p. 22). 
 
  The analysis of decentralisation in Pakistan by Cheema, Khwaja and Qadir 
(2007) shows that decentralisation initiatives came mostly from the military rulers in 
the country.  The most important attempt to revitalise the local governments was 
under General Musharraf in 1999. The initiatives included establishing the supremacy 
of district level Nazims over provincial bureaucrats, devolving the responsibility of a 
number of public services including primary education and health, farm and water 
management to district governments, introduction of rule based transfers and 
reservations for peasants and women in the elected local body.  Keefer, Narayan and 
Vishwanath (2007) find that there is no conclusive evidence of improvement in the 
quality of public services due to these initiatives. 
 
  The study of China by Justin Lin, Tao and Liu  (2007)  shows that  the 
decentralisation initiative was part of the basic market oriented reforms since late 
1970s. They concluded that decentralisation had a positive impact mainly in the 
coastal provinces, particularly in spurring competition between the township and 
village enterprises , which played a crucial role in accelerating economic growth in 
these areas.  However, the study showed that there was little inter-regional 
redistribution and the interior and backward regions and rural areas did not have 
access to adequate fiscal resources.  In the event, in these places, decentralisation 
merely resulted in providing unfunded mandates to the local governments. 
   14 
 
  The study of decentralisation in South Africa, particularly after the apartheid 
system was given up was an exercise in consolidat ing the local governments 
occupied by the whites with those occupied by the coloured people.  The 2000 reform 
consolidated 800 transitional councils to 231 municipalities and significant reforms 
were made to ensure adequate resources in an equitable formula based manner.  
Wittenberg (2007) argues that these were largely redistributive and has helped to 
reduce poverty and inter-racial inequity. In other respects like population, participation 
and reduction in corruption, the evidence is mixed. 
   
  The impact of decentralisation on corruption has also been a subject matter 
of a number of empirical studies, but there is no clear conclusion on this either.  
There are two opposing views in the literature.  One strand of literature argues that 
corruption is likely to be more at the local level in developing countries due to greater 
opportunity, dominance of local interests in the affairs of the local government, poor 
supervisory mechanisms and blurred distinction between local politicians and officials  
(Prod’homme,  1985, Tanzi, 1986). In contrast, others have argued that opportunities 
for corruption are less under decentralised governance due to greater transparency 
and accountability ( Klitgaard, 1988).   The empirical studies of Huther and Shah 
(1998)  and Fiscan and Gatti (2000) find negative correlation between fiscal 
decentralisation and corruption.  In another cross-country study including both 
developed and developing countries, Shah (2000a) finds that decentralisation 
enhances accountability.  In contrast, Treisman (2000) finds evidence of greater 
corruption in federal states.  Thus, there is no clear evidence to generalise the 
relationship between decentralisation and corruption and the w hether or not 
decentralisation leads to corruption depends on the nature of the power structure in 
local areas, quality of governance, transparency in administration, role of the media 
and the existence of checks and balances in the decentralised system . 
 
  The foregoing review shows that neither the theoretical studies nor empirical 
analyses show clear evidence that decentralisation leads to development.  Therefore, 
it would be unwise to presume that merely assigning constitutional status and 
devolving some powers to local governments, by  themselves would result in 
improving the  quality of lives of the people.   At the same time, it has been amply 
demonstrated that any centralised development strategy will not take into account the 
diverse needs of the population and is therefore, unworkable. 
   
The important issue therefore, is one of conditioning the context and design 
of decentralisation to make it   a catalyst in  development.  Often, the context or the 
prevailing objective conditions can be changed only in the medium term ; in the short 
term, if the context is hostile to the devolution of power, constitutional enablement 
and other policies and institutions may  simply fail to generate the dynamism required 
for development to accelerate.  In India, given its size and diversity, it is necessary 
that both the context has to be reformed to create an enabling environment in which 
decentralised institutions can prosper and decentralisation policies  are designed to 
ensure functional autonomy to decentralised institutions. 
 
4.  Panchayats and Development:  Case Studies on India 
 
(a)   Decentralised Planning and Dev elopment Initiatives 
 
  In this section,  besides recounting the various initiatives to adopt 
decentralised planning for development of the country, some interesting case studies   15 
 
of successful village panchayats  are summarised.  This helps to understand the 
important institutional factors as well as the design features of decentralisation that 
contribute to village panchayats playing a proactive role in development.    These 
lessons will help in identifying important policy and institutional changes required to 
spur village panchayats to act as catalysts in development. 
 
Attempts at adopting decentralised planning goes back to the First Five Year 
Plan itself, but these were largely  ad hoc and without any consistent and stable 
strategy.    The first plan recognised the need to have planning exercises at state, 
district and local community levels, but not much was done.  The creation of District 
Development Councils in the second plan to draw up plans right from the village level 
with people’s participation also did not meet with much success as  the enabling 
institutional framework simply did not exist.  The Balwant Rai Mehta Committee,  the 
First Administrative Reforms Commission and successive five year plans emphasised 
the need to have decentralised development planning to be framed at village, block, 
and district levels.  The Dantwala Committee recommended the formulation of block 
level planning to link village level planning with district level planning.  The Centrally 
Sponsored Scheme s (CSS) introduced in 1983-84 to strengthen the district planning 
machinery and creation of district credit plans at the instance of the Reserve Bank of 
India were in the direction of promoting development through decentralisation, but in 
the absence of a coherent system for implementation they did not achieve the desired 
objectives.  There were subsequent Committees  such as the Hanumantha Rao 
Committee and G.V.K.  Rao Committee  that  made recommendations to devolve 
functions and set up a responsive administration to promote rural development.  The 
73
rd  Constitutional  Amendment and the subsequent attempts to promote 
decentralised planning including the recommendations of the recent Expert Group for 
Decentralised Planning at the Grassroots Level (2006; Chairman: V. Ramachandran) 
are  other  attempts to promote decentralisation as  a  means to achieve rural 
development in the country.  Similarly in areas covered by the Sixth Schedule of the 
Constitution, attempts have been made to invest the traditional village development 
councils and district development  councils  with powers  to  undertake decentralised 
planning  from below .  However,  there is much to be done to create a proper 
decentralised institutional framework for development. 
   
Although it is not possible to discern a clear nexus between decentralisation 
and development, there is evidence in the  Indian context that a properly designed 
decentralisation in a congenial environment can improve welfare of the community.  
In general, decentralisation to rural local governments has not been very effective in 
most states.  In this otherwise desolate situation, the decentralisation experience of 
Kerala stands somewhat in contrast.  With  high rate of literacy and political 
awareness and relatively less uneven distribution of land holdings a higher rate of 
participation in gram sabhas is only to be expected.  In addition, gram panchayats in 
Kerala have an average population of more than 20,000, which enables them to reap 
greater scale economies in the provision of many public services.  Better information 
dissemination across panchayats  helps in replicating good practices throughout the 
state.  Indeed, people can benchmark the performances by observing good practices 
in other panchayats and pressurise their governments to adhere to the benchmark.
2  
                                                  
2  This is known as the Salmon m echanism.  Pierre Salmon developed the hypothesis on 
horizontal inter- governmental competition using a conceptual framework similar to the link 
order tournaments in which voters and opposition parties benchmark the performances of best 
performing local governments and pressurise their own government to provide comparable 
services.  See, Salmon (1987) and Breton, 1996.   16 
 
In addition to these favourable factors, the people’s plan movement initiated by the 
government (discussed in greater detail later) has had a significant impact in enabling 
panchayats to be the drivers of economic development in the state. 
   
  Although the general performance of  panchayats in promoting inclusive 
development has not been impressive, there are some cases where they have taken 
initiatives to ensure better service delivery or promote development in a systematic 
manner.  As  in Kerala, though to a lesser extent, decentralisation is considered to 
have promoted development in West Bengal and this is mainly attributed to relatively 
successful asset redistribution through land reforms.  There are also other isolated 
cases of decentralisation initiative acting as a catalyst in development.  The case of 
Hivre Bazaar in Nagar Taluka (Ahmednagar district), for example, brings out the 
impact of an integrated approach to achieving holistic development by revitalising the 
environment and creating livelihood opportunities, particularly to the disadvantaged 
sections.  Similarly, there are instances of panchayats in Karnataka taking initiatives 
to provide water supply and undertake  other developmental initiatives.   In other 
words, in what follows, we analyse case studies that showcase developmental efforts 
to accelerate growth, including those that advance poverty alleviation and achieve 
targeted delivery of services.   The experience of the  people’s plan movement and 
anecdotal evidence of some other successful cases of  panchayats contributing to 
various aspects of development are discussed in the following. 
 
(b)   Panchayats and Development:  People’s Planning Process in Kerala 
 
The most important innovation in a decentralised development strategy is the 
people’s plan introduced in Kerala.  The L eft  Democratic Party (LDP)  that came to 
power in Kerala in 1996 decided to devolve 33 per cent of the states’ plan budget for 
spending on development projects formulated by the panchayats at the village, block 
and district levels. Based on people’s preferences articulated by the gram sabhas 
(village assembly), village panchayats were  required to formulate their plans,  which 
were coordinated and vetted at the block level and approved at the district level by a 
District Planning Committee constituted in accordance with the provisions of the 
constitution to consolidate the district plan. This campaign is popularly known as the 
‘People’s Planning Campaign’ (Janakeeya Aasoothranam). 
   
The major objectives of decentralised development in Kerala are to: (i) 
promote local economic development by increasing production and productivity of 
agriculture and allied sectors and traditional and small scale industries with focus on 
employment and poverty reduction; (ii) reduce gender disparities; (iii)  integrate area 
development; (iv) upgrade the quality of basic services provided by  panchayats with 
special emphasis on health, education, water supply, sanitation including solid waste 
management and disabled care; (v)  improve governance particularly with reference 
to transparency,  participation and responsiveness; and (vi) bring about an organic 
relationship between transferred departments and local governments and role clarity. 
 
When it was initiated, t he concept of peoples’ plan, entailed sequence of 
phases with villagers, non-official experts and volunteers participating in preparing 
reports, formulating projects, and drafting the plan.  Important felt needs of the people 
were identified in the gram sabhas.  Various development seminars attended by 
delegates from the villages, officials from block, district and state agencies, and the 
non-government sector helped to assess resources of the  panchayats and 
preparation of reports.  Several volunteers comprising of retired teachers, retired 
bankers, and superannuated officials from the government and non-government   17 
 
sector helped to prepare development projects and these were included in the 
preparation of plans at the village level which were consolidated at  higher levels.  
Voluntary technical groups comprising of  enrolled retired technical experts and 
professionals, appraised the projects and plans of the local bodies (Issac, 2000).  
    
This is, by far, the best approach to decentralised planning a dopted 
anywhere in the country and therefore, is worthy of emulation in other places.  Of 
course, the approach is not without shortcomings and the report of the Committee on 
Evaluation of Decentralised Planning and Development (Chairman: M. A. Oommen) 
appointed by the Government of Kerala (Kerala, 2009) brings out some of them.  The 
first is that the system does not incorporate technical support and inputs.  It is argued 
that the quality of the work of the working groups preparing the projects could 
significantly improve if the  gram panchayat  presidents engaged technical experts  
from outside.  Second, there is a need to better integrate the local plans with the state 
plans and plan formulation process with budgeting.  Third, there is resentment about 
the plethora of guidelines and directives given to panchayats  on the ways in which 
they can use funds, such as on overall sectoral and special component plans, fixing 
percentage allocations to various sectors, women component plan, anganwadis and 
ashraya  scheme .  Fourth, although initially there  was much enthusiasm in the 
people’s planning over time, the entire process has become a routine exercise.  The 
Committee states, “…in the ultimate reckoning despite the Working Groups (WGs), 
clerks prepare the projects in a haphazard manner. Second, there is no coordination 
of the reports of the various sectoral WGs. In other words, decentralised planning 
becomes a fragmented exercise. This negates the essence of making comprehensive 
area plans.” (Kerala, 2009). 
    
  Despite these shortcomings, the grassroots planning experiment introduced 
in Kerala is unique.  It is not easy to overcome the resistance for transferring such a 
large volume of plan resources from the state government to the  panchayats and this 
could be done only due to the strong political will.  Once this was achieved, it created 
tremendous political goodwill and even as the party in power changed, decentralised 
planning continued.  Given that there is considerable transfer of funds from the 
central government for various central schemes, it is important that in addition to the 
states’ transfers, these too are incorporated in the people’s plans.  The Report of the 
Expert Group on Grassroots Planning provides a fairly detailed methodology to 
incorporate funds from central schemes in grassroots planning (India, 2006). 
 
(c)   The Green Kerala Express Social reality show 
 
The Kerala state government has employed  a novel method to activate 
competition among the panchayats and showcasing the best performing panchayats 
through a social reality show called, “The Green Kerala Express”.  This is a television 
reality show in which best performing three panchayats are given awards in a series 
of glittering popular shows involving prominent entertainers including film 
personalities.  
  
The  project was initiated by the Kerala Government in association with 
Thiruvananthapuram Doordarshan.    The competition first invited all  999  gram 
panchayats, 57 municipalities and five corporations in the state to provide a short 
video showcasing their sustainable development projects. More than 200 local 
governments responded with  interesting stories of local development, covering 
aspects such as water and land management, sanitation, environment, health, 
energy, education, social welfare, the NREGS, women empowerment projects taken   18 
 
up under the Kudumbashree programme, agriculture and improving food security.  Of 
these 152 were shortlisted and the production teams visited each of them to interact 
with the people which were captured in two short films, one on the cultural and 
historic profile of the village and the other on the developmental  initiative. These 
panchayats were then invited to the studio, where the films were screened and they 
interacted with a five member jury. Based on the percentage of the marks awarded to 
the panchayats which depended upon citizen votes collected through SMS, 15 LGs 
were eventually selected for the second round. The jury visited each of the 15 LGs 
along with the video team and evaluated their performance on the ground. Based on 
a final jury interaction onscreen, the best three panchayats and two municipalities 
were selected with audience participation in the selection. The best three panchayats 
that were awarded prizes by the Chief Minister of the state in the final show in 2010 
were: 
 
(i)  Elappully (Palakkad district): First Prize. 
(ii)  Akathethara (Palakkad district): Second Prize. 
(iii)  Adatt (Thrissur district): Third Prize 
 
Several factors contributed to the unqualified success of the TV programme:   
 
(a)  Adoption of the popular social reality show: The production quality was slick, 
with plenty of glamour in the form of good anchors and popular stars from the 
Malayalam film industry also anchoring some shows. 
(b)  The daily shows: Starting on March 1, 2010, the show ran continuously, with 
daily 40 minute episodes, culminating in the grand show finale, on 27 July. 
The daily episodes ensured audience interest and involvement in the voting 
for selection of the best performers,  
(c)  The credibility of the jury, which also comprised renowned literary, journalistic 
and academic figures respected in Kerala for their scholarship. The non-
partisan nature of the jury was an important factor, given Kerala’s strong 
party polarisation even at the LG level.  
(d)  The high stakes, the best three panchayats received prizes of Rs. 1 crore, 
Rs. 50 lakh and Rs. 25 lakh respectively. The remaining LGs participating in 
the final round received Rs. 10 lakh each.  
 
The  development schemes of  the prize winning panchayats are highlighted 
below: 
 
Elapully Panchayat, First prize winner 
 
This panchayat, over two years, increased the milk production by small dairy 
farmers from 2,400 litres a day to 12000 litres, increasing incomes by Rs. 7.5 crore in 
2009-10. The panchayat encouraged paddy farmers who were facing unsustainably 
high costs of cultivation to adopt dairying as a second livelihood option. Women from 
paddy growing families were supported to set up more than 600 diary units, each with 
two cows. The  panchayat provided direct support to women from their block 
development grants. In addition, it provided valuable support services, such as fodder 
cultivation on 50 acres of land and setting up a model veterinary hospital. As a result, 
the number of dairy farmers doubled from 1400 to 2800 in two years. 
  
Dairy farmers first supply farm fresh milk to households , hotels and other 
establishments in the  panchayat. The remaining milk is sold to the Cooperative,   19 
 
Milma. Some dairy farmers have also launched various value-added products under 
their own brand names.
3  
 
Families with more supplementary income from milk i ncreased paddy 
cultivation. The programme inspired the government higher secondary school to start 
fodder cultivation its two acres of surplus land.  To ensure that NREGA activities did 
not create a shortage of farm labour, it expanded the NREGA activities during the off 
season for paddy cultivation.   For six months of the paddy growing season, the 
NREGA programme was put on hold. Work under the scheme was then ramped up 
during the paddy off season, so that workers were assured of work all year around.  
 
Akathethara Gram Panchayat, Second prize winner 
 
Akathethara gram panchayat is located in the Palakkad gap, which is a 40 
kilometre wide gap in the Western Ghats.   In this ecologically fragile region, the 
panchayat launched the ‘Green the Gap’ programme on June 5 2009,  the World 
Environment day,  and planted more than one lakh saplings.  A year later, an 
independent survey showed that 90 per cent of the saplings had survived.  During 
2010, a further 25000 saplings were planted to cover all the public lands available in 
the village including the sides of roads and canals and the banks of the Kalpathy river. 
Afforestation was also taken up on private lands. To do this, the panchayat pooled 
the funds from various schemes on watershed development and involved farmers’ 
groups through the Integrated Watershed Committee of the panchayat.  
 
In addition to its work on improving the environment, the panchayat also set 
up an agro clinic to give farmers tips on good farming and has set up a labour bank, 
to ensure that there is adequate labour for agricultural operations. Other innovations 
taken up by the panchayat include a fully computerised office with a front office where 
applications and petitions can be submitted for services such as obtaining certificates 
of ownership, birth, death, residence. The panchayat has established a ‘Senior 
Citizens Club' to make it a senior citizen friendly panchayat. Health care is being 
provided to terminally ill patients under the Ashraya Scheme . The panchayat has also 
set up a solid waste management plant in its bid to become a zero waste panchayat. 
It has already won the Nirmal Gram Puraskar of the central government for its total 
sanitation initiatives. 
 
Adatt Panchayat, Third prize winner  
 
This  panchayat in Trissur began to convert itself into an organic farming 
village starting from 2002, by reducing the consumption of toxic pesticides in the 
paddy fields, which had also contaminated the major water sources in the area. It did 
this through a public campaign to persuade farmers to drop the use of pesticides, as 
also by taking up a demonstration of organic farming techniques  using only 
environmentally friendly pesticides. The paddy produced in the panchayat through 
chemical free farming was converted into rice by  Kudumbashree groups and is now 
marketed as the  Adatt brand of rice and commands a premium value. This 
experience was translated into producing organic coconut and the oil produced was 
marketed under the brand name, Kerasree.  
 
Another successful initiative of the panchayat has been to improve the quality 
of drinking water, by reducing saline water intrusion. A treatment plant to reduce the 
                                                  
3 Adapted from the Hindu, Kerala edition, 23 July, 2010   20 
 
iron content in the water was established in 2005 and a participatory drinking water 
supply project was launched. Earlier, this panchayat had already won the Nirmal 
Gram Puraskar.  
 
A unique initiative taken up by  Adatt Panchayat is the setting up of an Adatt 
Gram Panchayat  Tourism Promotion Council, which manages a riverside tourism 
spot, providing boating facilities for tourists. The panchayat has a picturesque hill, 
Vilangan Kunnu and it is also a haven for migratory birds.
4  
 
Adatt has also covered more than 3,500 BPL and 1,000 APL families under 
the Universal Health Insurance Scheme, in the process winning the first  Health 
Security Panchayat Award instituted in the state.  
 
The analysis of the winners, as also the well performing panchayats that 
reached the second round, certain trends become clear. First, all winners of the 
Green Kerala express show have focussed on promoting larger local development 
issues and not provision of local public services . This was made possible because of 
the availability of block grants for the panchayats which in turn provides scope for 
innovation. These winners have also  understood the intricate  economic linkages  
between different kinds of complimentary  activities to strengthen the developmental 
effort. Thus dairying has been linked to paddy cultivation and marketing of agricultural 
products.  
 
The winners have been innovative, both in the way that they have run 
conventional programmes (deliberate slowing down of the NREGA to prevent artificial 
shortages of labour – Elapully) as also in starting new ones (Adatt’s tourism project). 
They have also been versatile; while promoting local economic development, they 
have not neglected their core responsibilities of improving civic services, or providing 
social services (the senior citizens club in Akathethara). Quite often, the confidence 
and credibility built up through running core responsibilities well, have played a large 
part in successful implementation of development programmes. 
  
Finally, the state government has played an important promotional role in 
providing the right environment for the panchayats to undertake such innovations. 
The provision of a block grant with only broad conditionalities on its use is an 
important contributor. Second, the decentralised planning methodology in the state, 
which promotes a cooperative rather than an adversarial relationship between the 
different tiers of LGs, has made the convergence easier. Third, despite the criticisms 
of  Kudumbashree programme  for ‘persuading’ the poor women to join collectives, 
such linkages have played a great part in the success of the development initiatives 
taken up in these panchayats. The Kudumbashree g roups have provided flexibility, 
acted as outreach agents of the panchayats, and also as important links in the 
marketing system so essential to make economic development initiatives successful 
and sustainable. 
     
There are important lessons for both central and state governments from the 
Green Kerala Express initiative.  The first is that there is not much need to undertake 
role clarity exercises such as activity mapping for economic development activities. 
Such role clarity exercises are difficult, because the activities relating to them are 
intertwined across jurisdictions and cannot be mapped to  specific jurisdictions.  
 
                                                  
4 Adapted from the Hindu, Kerala Edition, 7 July 2010   21 
 
(d)   Integrated Development Experiences: Case Studies 
 
Hivre Bazar:  An exemplary instance of a gram panchayat playing a lead role in 
development is brought out vividly in the case of Hivre Bazaar panchayat.  Located in 
Nagar Taluk of  Ahmednagar district in Maharashtra state, the  panchayat  was 
responsible for transforming the village.  This provides  an example of the way in 
which the panchayat can act as a catalyst in development.   
 
In 2001 the Hivre Bazar panchayat had a population of just 1150 or 205 
households.  In the 1970s the place was synonymous with scant rainfall, acute water 
scarcity, repeated crop failures and land degradation resulting in  a number of 
households migrating to other places in search of livelihood.  In this environment the 
villagers elected Popat Rao Bahuji Pawar as the  sarpanch of the village panchayat in 
1990.  Pawar, a  post graduate in commerce, was inspired by the life and teachings of 
Anna Hazare and Baba Amte and took the leadership  mantle to transform the village.  
Based on the priorities identified by the villagers in the gram sabha in 1990, he was 
able to identify socio economic problems and requirements of the villagers to evolve 
an integrated development programme.  
  
The important initiatives that he embarked upon in pursuing a programme of 
sustainable development in the village included installation of 112 bio gas plants to 
improve the health conditions of women, ensuring construction of adequate number 
of toilets to prevent open defecation and ensure dignity of women, and construction of 
a mosque for the only Muslim household living in the village.  On the energy 
resources and environmental front, energy needs of the village are by and large met 
by bio gas plant s and at present, almost all the households use LPG.  The village 
uses vermin-composting to convert animal waste into manure.  It has installed soak 
pits to manage waste water, underground drainage to ensure cleanliness in the 
village and the people have been sensitised to ensure proper waste segregation and 
management. 
   
The most important initiative, however, relates to water management and 
harvesting systems to harness the rain water.  The major developmental schemes 
adopted by the panchayats include the watershed development programme, drought 
prone area programme and the rural sanitation programme.  Much of the 
developmental work was done by the voluntary labour contribution of the villagers 
(shramdan).  There were strict rules specified to ensure ban on grazing, ban on tree 
cutting, ban on alcohol consumption and persuasive efforts at family planning (one 
family, one child).  In that sense, the developmental effort is aimed not merely at 
ensuring sustained growth but involves social inclusion and cohesion as well. 
 
Apart from ensuring water to the villagers, the focus on integrated 
development has been to ensure human development through health and education, 
preventing uncontrolled exploitati on of ground water and selective ban on cultivating 
water intensive crops.  The panchayat leadership has put in a lot of effort in  to  
providing guidance on the crops to be cultivated, compost development and 
watershed development and judicious use of underground water.   The  panchayat 
leadership has also made efforts to develop animal husbandry. 
   
The consequences of this integrated development programme have been 
impressive.  Water conservation has solved the problem of water scarcity and there 
are now over 300 wells in the village with adequate amount of water supply.  The 
farmers in the village have adopted crop patterns depending upon the water   22 
 
availability.  The village has 100 per cent  pucca  houses, cemented roads, 
underground drainage system, primary and secondary schools, a community centre, 
anganwadi centres and a primary health care centre.  Income levels of the people 
have increased significantly due to higher yield in agriculture and dairy farming.  Not 
surprisingly, the village has earned several awards both from the Government of 
Maharashtra and from the Government of India.  The important  amongst these 
include Mahatma Phule Water and Land Service Award in 2002 from Government of 
Maharashtra, Krishi Ratna award in 2007 and the National Water Award from the 
Government of India  in 2007.  Hivre Bazaar presents a case of an integrated 
sustainable development promoted by a village panchayat managed through inspired 
leadership.  This is a typical case where leadership can mobilise people to achieve 
the common good.   
 
(e)   Sustainable Development Examples 
 
Gendra, Attha and  Bari Sirkiri  in Madhya Pradesh:  These three panchayats 
constitute the mini-watershed (areas varying between 1,000-10,000 ha area) at the 
headwaters of the Kara river (a tributary of Narmada) in Alirajpur district of Madhya 
Pradesh. These panchayats have initiated a voluntary communitarian forest, soil and 
water conservation initiative even prior to the 73
rd Constitutional amendment.  This is 
a case where the panchayats adopted the traditional Dhas  (voluntary community 
service) in which, the inhabitants who are predominantly tribal, pool their labour and 
resources for sustainable development. 
   
The three panchayats are inhabited by the Bhilala and Bhil tribal population.  
Traditionally, these groups adopted the Dhas system in which a group of 10-12 
households teamed and pooled their labour to do agricultural work like ploughing and 
weeding.  From 1989, they organised themselves under a trade union  Khedut 
Mazdoor Chetna Sangath and revived this communitarian custom for soil and water 
conservation.  Initially two villages Gendra and Attha were in one panchayat and the 
sarpanch was  Nayaka Thakrala, who was a traditional priest and a visionary leader.  
Later, the two villages have become separate panchayats and Attha panchayat was 
led by Gomar Singh Padhyar, who was also an energetic leader.  Apart from these, 
women worked under the leadership of Dahelibai Laliya.  Sirkhari panchayat closely 
followed the development pattern set by the other  two  panchayats  under the 
leadership of one of the members of the panchayats, Bilaria Singh.  
 
The three panchayats have done considerable work through their voluntary 
cooperation method, much more than the work carried out from the funds made 
available through the panchayats.   From 1994, they have taken up small structures 
for which cement had to be purchased.  The amount of work done through voluntary 
cooperation was considerable in soil and water conservation and these included 
bunding and levelling, gully plugs and boulder checks, farm ponds and composting.   
 
The programme has brought in immense benefits to the villagers.  The 
protection of forests and efforts to prevent its degradation has effectively countered 
the claim that tribals are destroying the forests.  The social protection of forests has 
helped in the regeneration of forests, with small groups of people patrolling them by 
turns to prevent its exploitation by outsiders.  The fodder generated in the fallow lands 
is sold to the members and the r evenue generated from this is kept in a fund for 
carrying out plantation work.  The availability of fodder has enabled goat and buffalo 
rearing on a larger scale, which has supplemented incomes.  The strict vigilance has 
also increased firewood and non-timber products with significant benefits to women   23 
 
and children. Intensive soil and water conservation work has helped to increase 
natural and artificial recharge in the watershed and consequently the Kara river is 
now flowing round the year.  Enhanced water availability combined with availability of 
electricity and diesel for pumps has helped to augment irrigation in the watershed 
areas and has improved agricultural incomes.  The three village panchayats are a 
model and provide important lessons in the way traditional methods can be usefully 
harnessed to provide communitarian facilities through the panchayats. 
 
(f)   Revenue Mobilisation 
 
An important aspect of successful decentralisation is mobilisation of 
resources of the community for providing public services.  Raising resources from the 
community ensures that the public services are paid for, by the people who benefit 
from the service and this enhances both efficiency and accountability.  The two most 
common ways of raising revenue at local level are through appropriate user charges 
and through the property tax.  
  
Pune and Satara districts in Maharashtra present an interesting example in 
the way it is possible to significantly enhance the revenue from property taxes by 
introducing a simple area based tax system at the panchayat level.  In the two 
districts, property taxes based on capital value or annual rental value were reformed 
by a simpler and a more transparent area based method for determining the tax base.  
Once the parameters  are specified, property owners can determine the tax liability 
themselves.  Looking at the successful transition and improvement in revenue 
productivity, the Maharashtra state amended the rules under the Panchayat Act to 
enable the gram panchayats to adopt the area based system.  The consequence of 
this was to substantially increase revenue from property tax by almost threefold from 
Rs. 147.56 crore in 1999-2000 to Rs. 425.93 crore in 2003-04.   
 
According to the District Rural Development Agency in Satara, it is possible 
to improve  tax  revenue  collections further  by introducing  incentive grants to the 
panchayats linked to the additional tax revenue collected beyond a specified amount.    
Panchayats  not levying the tax according to the new system, will not be eligible to 
receive the grants.  If properly designed, this could substantially increase the 
revenues of village panchayats and help them to augment public services according 
to people’s preferences while ensuring accountability in public service provision. 
 
(g)   Efficient Prov ision of Services: Water Supply 
 
Guttakaadu Gram Panchayat:
5  Kinnigoli is a gram panchayat in Dakshina Kannada 
district, about 30 kilometres from Mangalore. The village is located a few kilometers 
off the Mangalore-Udupi national highway. The panchayat started the  “Guttakaadu” 
water supply system recently, which  is  a successful example of  a panchayats  
mobilising resources from the people and ensuring efficient water supply to them.  
 
The construction of the system was taken up under the Rajiv Gandhi Rural 
Water  and  Sanitation Scheme, which was then known as the “Sector Reforms” 
programme. The Guttakaadu System has a bore-well as the source of water, which is  
                                                  
5 This is taken from the note: “Guttakadu – a piped water supply project with a difference” b y 
Kaushik Mukherjee, Secretary, Rural Development  and  Panchayat Raj, Government of 
Karnataka with active help from the  Adhyaksha  & members of the Kinnigoli gram panchayat, 
Dakshina Kannada district.   24 
 
to a 50,000 litre capacity overhead tank. There are nearly 100 individual household 
connections and the total cost of the system was about Rs.7 lakh.  According to the 
guidelines of “sector reforms”, the village community had to contribute in advance 10 
per cent of the capital cost. The “village water & sanitation committee” set up by the 
panchayat raised the required amount of Rs.70000 from the villagers.  The committee 
also  floated  a tender for execution of the project and  managed the subsequent 
financial transactions. 
 
The panchayat president and members were clear in their views that the 
entire project must be self sustaining.  They initially collected a onetime flat rate 
charge of Rs. 1000 for each household connection.  Thereafter, they decided to levy 
graded water charges every month depending upon the consumption of water by 
each household as follows: 
 
For upto the first 10,000 litres  Rs. 50 flat rate 
For the next 10,000 litres  Rs. 50+Rs.10 per additional kilolitre 
For the next 10,000 litres  Rs. 150+Rs.20 per additional kilolitre 
 
To implement this tariff system, the Kinnigoli panchayat installed water flow 
meters on each of its connections to the houses. Experience reflects the foresight of 
the leaders to make the water supply system economically viable, their sagacity, and 
the willingness of the people to pay for a service. The very fact that revenue accrues 
to the panchayat based on the quantum of water supply ensures proper maintenance 
and minimi ses wastages.   
 
The panchayat has also installed separate electric meters for water supply 
and street lights, which makes it easy for it to keep proper and separate accounts of 
the two activities.  On an average, the panchayat was able to generate a surplus of 
over Rs.40000 per year and the surplus would go up as the number of household 
connections increase.    The Guttakaadu experience shows that, a panchayat can 
create  “self-sustaining”  water supply systems.  Surely, the experience is worth 
replicating in other panchayats. 
 
Shiruguppi Gram Panchayat: Shiruguppi gram panchayat in the Belgaum district in 
Karnataka state provides another example  of a village panchayat ensuring efficient 
water supply.  This is a gram panchayat where the existing sources of water supply 
had no potable water, and the water piped from the Krishna River was polluted with 
chemicals released from  the various sugar factories located on its banks.  The 
villagers came to know of the possibility of getting World Bank assistance from an 
NGO and contributed up front the required 30 per cent money for sanitation.  
However, the World Bank assistance was not adequate and the contractor appointed 
by the district panchayat carried out poor quality work.  In the meantime, the newly 
elected members of the gram sabha came to know of the clean water project (Jal 
Nirmala Yojana), but the attempt to secure assistance from the state government was 
mired in bureaucratic tangle.  However, after a persistent struggle by  panchayat 
members including a hunger strike, they  got the project sanctioned under the clean 
water project and this has ensured adequate drinking water supply to the villagers.  
  
Malluru  Gram  Panchayat:  Malluru  gram panchayat in Chikkaballapur district in 
Karnataka state had a population of 6052 according to 2001 census.  The gram 
panchayat was faced with the acute problem of drinking water.  Based on the advice 
given by the district panchayat, the village panchayat appointed a water supply and 
sanitation committee with  representatives f rom different agencies in the village   25 
 
(anganwadi workers, health workers, villagers, Assistant Junior Engineer etc.).  The 
Committee met every month and took immediate steps to provide water to the poor 
and needy through two tankers.  After gaining confidence of the people, the villagers 
were asked to pay upfront to get metered water supply in their houses.  Sub-
committees were appointed to supply water to different localities, to oversee the 
quality of water supplied, avoid waste and to ensure economic use of water.  The 
“waterman” was given the responsibility of reading the meter once in every two 
months and to collect the charges.  This has helped the panchayats  to pay  the 
electricity charges, the salary of the waterman, and save some money which has 
augment ed the water supply over time and extended the hours of water supplied to 
the villagers.  This is yet another success story of the panchayats.  
 
Sanur  Gram Panchayat: Sanur  gram  panchayat provides an example similar to 
Guttkaadu scheme described above.  This is yet another example demonstrating that 
the people in the villagers are willing to pay for water supply to sustain it in an 
economically viable manner if the water supply schem e is designed and implemented 
to provide efficient supply.   
 
Sanur  village is located in Karkala taluk in Udupi district.  It had a population 
of 6328 according to 2001 census.  Prior to the setting up of the water supply scheme, 
the p eople in the village had to depend on public taps  and this not only was 
inconvenient  to most villagers, but also resulted  in  a lot of wastage and poor 
maintenance of the taps.  The  panchayat members , f orgetting their political 
differences decided to provide water supply to individual houses by charging them at 
graded rates.  The rates were Rs 50 per 10,000 litres and Rs 10 for every additional 
1000 litres.  Sanur    panchayat   with an  annual revenue of only 3.5 lakh started 
collecting additional Rs 5 lakh per year from water supply.  They were so successful 
that they have had to extend the supply of water to the neighbouring panchayats like 
Nitte and Miyyar and parts of Karkalla municipal area, at their request.   
 
(h)   Summary of the Experiences 
 
  The foregoing examples of successful experiences of panchayats involved in 
integrated and sustainable development of the villages, ability to create systems to 
collect revenues for augmenting the standards of public services and creation of 
viable system of essential service like water supply  provide a number of lessons.   
What is resented are only a few examples to demonstrate the proactive role played 
by the panchayats.   There are several such examples of panchayats contributing to 
various aspects of sustainable development, which  show  that  under favourable 
conditions, and if the system is designed properly,  panchayats can be effective 
catalysts in development.   Unfortunately, no systematic attempt has been made at 
any level to put together a compendium of successful experiences, which can inspire 
other panchayats to embark on developmental initiatives.  In fact, horizontal learning 
through effective dissemination of successful experiences and creation of systems to 
share the experiences horizontally among the panchayats can be a great source of 
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5.  Catalysing Panchayats for Development: Reform Issues 
   
 
Effective decentralisation provides greater choice to the people to participate 
in decision making and this could act as a catalyst in development.  It is also argued 
that  decentralisation can  improve efficiency in service delivery and enhance 
accountability.  However, effective decentralisation itself requires effective 
participation  of people and conditions and most of the so-called decentralised 
systems do not fulfil this essential condition. It therefore stands to reason that a 
review of both analytical studies and available empirical evidence is not very helpful 
to clearly establish a relationship between decentralisation and development.   
 
The studies that examine the empirical relationship between decentralisation 
and development do not  enable a clear conclusion that decentralisation necessarily 
results in development.  I n India,  there are also questions on what constitutes 
decentralisation; often, constitutional enablement is taken to be synonymous with 
decentralisation.   Experience shows that statutory status is neither a necessity nor a 
sufficient condition for effective decentralisation, though it can be immensely helpful 
in furthering the cause of decentralisation in terms of empowering people.  In Canada, 
sub-provincial decentralisation is the provincial responsibility and yet, it is one of the 
most decentralised federations.   In China too,  where local governments have no 
constitutional protection, there is considerable effective decentralisation and counties 
and townships have played a very important role in the development of the country.
6    
Even within India, we can see wide variations in the role of local governments in their 
contribution to development in general and public service delivery, in particular. 
 
  The above proposition should not be taken to mean that  constitutional 
enablement is not important.  Surely, statutory status can be immensely helpful in 
empowering  panchayats.  Constitutional amendments make local governments 
inextinguishable,  and provide  them  with  specified legal space  to  function 
independently.  Nevertheless, r eal empowerment of the local governments requires 
empowerment of the people and the panchayats can contribute to development only 
when the people are empowered and enabled to  effectively participate  in the decision 
making process. 
 
  The relevant question to address  in Indian context is  not whether 
decentralisation to  panchayats has led to development, but rather, how can 
decentralisation be designed and implemented to make them catalysts in 
development.   The critical issue from the point of view of inclusive development in 
India is not whether, but how can the panchayats be made to galvanise development 
in the villages.  In other words, it is important to identify the “context” as well as 
“design” factors that impede  panchayats from playing their developmental role.
7  
Empowerment of panchayats by empowering the people is necessary for inclusive 
governance, and that should go far beyond providing them the  constitutional status.  
  
In spite of various shortcomings in the design of decentralisation, we have 
pointed out some successful cases of panchayats contributing to various aspects of 
development in different states in India.  These are not the only successful cases; in 
                                                  
6 In China, all governments below the centre are labelled as local governments.  See, Rao 
(2003).  
7 Bardhan and Mookherjee (2007) identify the factors determining decentralisation as “context” 
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fact, there are several, though we have overlooked many of these because our 
analysis has focussed on the failures rather than  successes.  Indeed, these 
experiences show that the contribution of  panchayats to development could have 
been even greater had the design and implementation of decentralisation  been 
according to the basic principles listed above.  In other words, many of t he 
panchayats were able to enhance the freedoms of the people in the rural areas in 
spite of the handicaps inherent in the system of devolution of powers and 
lackadaisical implementation.  
 
 In a market economy, improvements in the standards of living of the people 
require the people to participate in market activities  — both product and factor 
markets — in a meaningful manner.  Disadvantaged sections do not have any assets 
and they earn their incomes out of selling their labour and sweat. And the only way 
they can improve their living standards is by increasing their labour productivity.  This 
requires them to be healthy so that they can work on a regular basis and acquire 
education and skills to increase their productivity and market power.  Panchayats 
have a role in both ensuring participation of people in governance and  markets and in 
enabling  healthy  human development.  However, success in achieving these 
objectives requires fulfilment of several important preconditions. The experience of 
the functioning of panchayats in the states in India and the examples of relatively 
successful cases bring out some important lessons which can be useful in design 
policies to make  panchayats to  better contribute to development and these are 
discussed in the following. 
 
(i)   The analysis of the experience of  panchayats in delivering public services 
shows that they are relatively successful in areas where the asset distribution is 
relatively more even.  Given that land is the major asset owned by rural households, 
panchayats are more successful in delivering public services in places where land 
reforms have been effective in ensuring the land to the cultivator.   More even 
distribution of assets in a village ensures even distribution of power and prevents  elite 
capture of public services.   Generally, West Bengal is considered to be a state with 
more effective land reforms.  Although the share of West Bengal in total cropped area 
of the country is just 3 per cent, it accounted for nearly 20 per cent of all cultivable 
land redistributed though land reform legislations.  In fact, over 40 per cent of the 
beneficiaries from land reform in the country were in West Bengal alone. As 
Sengupta and Gazdar (1997; p. 132) state, “If the development experience of much 
of India is plagued by the political domination of propertied elites, with little or no 
interest in pro-poor interventions, here is the c ase of a State where the situation 
appears to be quite different”.   Bardhan and Mookherjee (2007; p. 217) also do not 
find evidence of elite capture within villages    
 
Interestingly, the actual land redistribution  due to land reforms in West 
Bengal as elsewhere has been marginal and for the majority of the landless, wage 
labour remained the most important source of livelihood.   Indeed, despite land 
reforms, in several areas of West Bengal the system of share cropping is still 
prevalent.  Although two-thirds of the local government positions are secured by 
landless, small and marginal land holders, this is smaller than their demographic 
weight of 96 per cent.   Nevertheless, the revitalisation of PRIs in the state along with 
the redistribution of land has  led to much greater participation of the people  in 
planning and implementation of the various programmes. 
   
The interesting contrast comes f rom places where local governance 
institutions have not helped in realising the growth potential.  Banerjee and Laxmi   28 
 
(2005) map growth with land tenure systems in different states and conclude that 
agriculture stagnated in districts which had a zamindari  system  of tenure which 
underlines the importance of land reforms in creating a favourable structure of 
incentives for growth.  Land redistribution reinforces popular participation in decision 
making to make the local governance more responsive to the needs of the people 
and thus, can contribute to development. 
 
From the policy perspective therefore, land reform is an important 
complementary policy to decentralisation. However, land reforms have not been very 
successful in several regions in the country for various reasons. But that does not 
imply that in these places panchayats cannot play a proactive role in development.  If 
indeed rural asset distribution through land reforms is not a feasible proposition at this 
stage, then it is necessary to find alternative measures that would overcome the 
disadvantages arising from skewed distribution to avoid capture of public services by 
the landed elite. One way to deal with this is to empower the landless labourers and 
marginal farmers with human capital to match them with landed elite. 
 
(ii)  If the people do not have land or other assets and the only asset the people 
have is labour, it is important to enable them to increase their capabilities to enhance 
their freedoms.   Education and skill development can enhance p roductivity and 
increase incomes of the people and thus, substitute land ownership.  Education also 
contributes to greater participation of the people in decision making at the village 
panchayat level.   
  
  The analysis of the performance of panchayats in different states and regions 
in India shows that panchayats have been relatively more successful in contributing 
to development in places where the literacy rate and education standards were higher.  
Spread of education and health to the disadvantaged sections including the landless, 
small and marginal farmers enhances their productivity and incomes.  It increases the 
participation rate of the people in local governance to make the panchayats more 
responsive to their needs and preferences.  Better education to the disadvantaged 
sections makes the local governance as well as development inclusive.  
     
  Kerala presents the most successful case of panchayats contributing to 
development in India.  In this, the part played by literacy and education of the people 
cannot be underestimated.  High literacy rate and high degree of political awareness 
of the people in the state has enabled much greater participation in local governance 
than that is seen in other states.  The large pool of retired teachers, officials and 
technical persons available in the state and the systems to harness their expertise in 
preparing and validating the people’s plan has been the cornerstone in the 
developmental strategy in the state.  Devolution of plan funds for spending at the 
local level was an important decision, but this could not have yielded the desired 
results had people’s plan not been successfully designed and implemented, besides  
high degree of literacy and education was an important contributing factor to this. 
 
  The contribution of high degree of literacy and education in assisting the 
panchayats to successfully meet developmental challenges is also seen in the 
coastal districts of Karnataka.  In terms of literacy rate and educational standards of 
population, the three coastal  districts of Dakshina Kannada, Udupi and Uttara 
Kannada are comparable to Kerala in the south and Goa in the north of these districts.  
The analysis of village panchayats in Udupi shows that the revenue collection in the 
panchayats was substantially higher (Rao, Amar Nath, and Vani, 2003).   There is 
considerable anecdotal evidence relating to various developmental initiatives taken   29 
 
by the panchayats in the coastal districts of Karnataka mainly due to the better 
educational standards of population in the region. 
 
  From the policy perspective, this brings out two important focus issues.  The 
first is that human development policies are complementary to decentralised 
development and the focus on ensuring access to education, skill development and 
healthcare with greater emphasis on preventative health are important.  Focus on 
human development is a necessary complementary policy for panchayats to succeed 
in acting as catalysts in development.  Second, it is important to find mechanisms to 
harness the pool of educated manpower that exists in rural areas and create groups 
that could provide technical guidance in preparing the projects, finalising the plans 
and ensuring their effective implementation.  In fact, there is a case for creating 
specialised expert groups whose services can be contracted by the panchayats.  
 
(iii)  Does reservation of seats to women in the panchayats contribute to inclusive 
development? The 73rd Amendment to the Indian constitution mandated that no less 
than a third of the total number of seats in village governments (panchayats), and no 
less than a third of the office of chairperson of the panchayat should be reserved for 
women.  In fact, the states of Bihar, Himachal Pradesh, Chattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh 
and Uttarakhand have gone a step further and have legislated for the reservation of 
50 per cent of the seats in panchayats.  Much of the descriptive literature has argued 
that reservation does not really result in ensuring greater inclusiveness of equality as 
the women who context elections in reserved constituencies merely echo the views of 
their husbands or represent some powerful interests of the village.  However, another 
strand of literature argues that reservations provide an opportunity for educated and 
committed women to take leadership roles in village panchayats and lead village 
development.  They are less corrupt and take into account the concerns of women in 
allocating resources and this will result in improving the quality of governance and 
ensure delivery of public services according to the felt needs of the people.  
  
There are very few empirical studies testing the impact of women 
reservations on public service delivery.  Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2007) in their 
study of West Bengal and Rajasthan find that  gender of the village president 
significantly alters the expenditure composition. In both West Bengal and Rajasthan, 
women complain more about drinking water, and naturally, expenditure allocations 
were significantly higher in panchayats  with women  Pradhans.  In general, the 
expenditure pattern corresponded to the general complaints of women and based on 
family considerations.  They show that reservation for women and scheduled castes 
(SCs) makes a significant difference in expenditure allocations.  Both women and 
SCs spend more o n services they want (Chattopadhyay and Dufflo, 2007).   They 
argue that properly implemented reservations can benefit distributive equity and 
service delivery in a decentralised system.   In contrast, Ban and Rao (2008) do not 
find evidence to the effect that reserved women presidents ensure delivery of public 
services congruent to the preferences of women in the southern states.  They find 
that the background of the woman president as well as the nature of village 
institutions,  particularly the caste structure does impact on public service delivery.  
Generally, women presidents when they are more experienced are  effective.  
Similarly, in villages where upper castes dominate, women presidents are less 
effective which may be due to the fact that caste structures may be correlated with 
structures of patriarchy.   The problem is particularly severe in places where the caste 
(khap)  panchayats have significant influence, where upper castes dominate and 
where parallel bodies have substantially usurped the functions of  panchayats.  
Among the southern states, women  presidents in reserved village panchayats  in   30 
 
Andhra Pradesh perform the worst, while in Kerala  and Karnataka, they  perform 
better which probably indicates that the system tended to mature when it is practiced 
for a longer time period as the reservation system has been in place much longer in 
Kerala and Karnataka than in Andhra Pradesh.  
  
Many states have introduced rotation system in panchayats.   The rotation 
system for short durations although provides opportunity to larger number of elected 
representatives to manage the affairs of the  panchayats,  however, is clearly 
undesirable.  In particular, the rotation of Pradhans every one or two years, as done 
in Karnataka and Maharashtra,  not only deprives them of the opportunity to gain 
valuable  leadership experience,  but also  establishes and aggravates a perverse 
structure of incentives.  With short terms, Pradhans tend to  have a short term horizon 
and their focus invariably shifts towards making the gains in the short term rather than 
ensuring efficient governance and delivery of public services.    
 
Considering the benefits of reservation, the Government of India has decided 
to introduce a constitutional amendment bill in the Parliament to enhance reservation 
of seats for women in panchayats to 50 per cent in all states.  This is a welcome 
measure and surely will help in improving the governance in  panchayats.  The 
benefits of this will be even more if this is accompanied with measures at building 
capacity among elected women representatives. 
  
(iv)  One of the important features of successful panchayats is strong, visionary 
and committed leadership. One of the implementable rules of fiscal decentralisation is 
to have champions (Bahl, 2002).  Leadership matters and it matters particularly in 
states where the literacy rates are low.  While the availability of  visionary and 
committed leadership is not a general phenomenon, but wherever it is found, it results 
in  panchayats making significant contribution to the development of the village.  
Indeed, enlightened leadership not only helps the  panchayat where such leaders 
exist, but also creates pressures in neighbouring  panchayats to contribute to 
development.  This is akin to the Salmon mechanism in which the performances of 
such leaders and best performing panchayats are benchmarked and their own locality 
is pressurised to perform according to the benchmark.   
 
That leadership can play  an important role in empowering people to remove 
their “unfreedoms” can be seen at various levels.  Indeed, leadership played an 
important role in rejuvenating panchayats in Karnataka in the late eighties with Abdul 
Nazeer Sab, the Minister for Panchayati Raj and Rural Development in Karnataka 
playing a pivotal role.  Indeed, it is often mentioned that under his initiative, the extent 
of decentralisation in Karnataka far exceeded that in other states and in many ways, 
his initiatives were adopted in the constitutional amendment.  In fact, whenever an 
enlightened leader is in charge of the PRIs, the entire environment and the incentive 
structure changes , as was also seen when  M. Y Ghorpade was the Minister for Rural 
Development and Panchayati Raj.  In Kerala too, the role of leadership has not been 
very recognised, but the effort of a group of people under the leadership of I. S. Gulati 
and Thomas Isaac in designing and implementing peoples’ plan cannot be 
underestimated.   
    
  A classic example of what enlightened leadership can do make panchayats 
to become catalysts in development is shown in the case of Hivere Bazar Panchayat 
described above.   It was the inspiring leadership of Popat Rao Bahuji Pawar, that 
helped to transform the village.   There are several other instances where the local 
leadership has been responsible for delivering basic community services to the   31 
 
people in the villages.  Indeed, when an inspired leader takes charge and manages 
the affairs of the panchayats for five to 10 years, he/she sets the benchmark and 
creates systems  for public service delivery.  The people in the  village expect the 
succeeding leaders to achieve the same level of services and the system will 
continue at least for some time even if the new leaders are not as committed and 
inspirational.  It can also create a “Salmon mechanism” or a demonstration effect for 
the villages in the neighbourhood as described above. 
   
  While leadership in panchayats is important to make them developmental 
catalysts, it cannot create a sustained pressure.  It is not possible to ensure that only 
inspiring leaders will get elected and become village panchayat presidents.  In many 
villages, people elect their leaders not for their inspiring leadership but for many other 
considerations.  Often, having a committed leader as a village sarpanch is a sheer 
matter of chance.  Here again, better education and creating the system to make the 
information on the performances of different panchayats in delivering public services  
widely available to the general public can help to set benchmarks for the role of 
leadership itself.  People surely would like to emulate successes and the examples of 
successful leadership can be useful in catalysing economic development. 
 
(v)  Some of the case studies presented in the earlier section shows that, 
contrary to the general impression, it is possible to raise revenues in panchayats and 
this is particularly true when the people in the villages are able to establish a direct 
linkage between tax payments and benefits received.   The area-based property tax 
system implemented in Satara and Pune districts of Maharashtra described earlier 
has important lessons to offer for mobilising revenues in panchayats not only in other 
districts of Maharashtra, but in other states as well.   
 
  The important issue here is that designing a simple and implementable 
property tax system requires preparation of property tax code in each of the 
panchayats.  This requires a detailed information system relating to the ownership of 
immovable properties, their locational features and quality of construction.  Given the 
capacity constraints of the village panchayats, this can be facilitated  by the  state  
government creating a specialised agency  for preparing the code for each of the 
villages.  In doing this, it is important to understand the local conditions.  This agency 
can also help in estimating the tax demand. 
 
Introducing an incentive system to ensure better collection efficiency can be 
useful to augment the resources of the  panchayats.    A certain proportion of the 
grants to be given to the  panchayats from the state governments can  be kept 
separate for incentivising revenue collections.  Incentives designed through matching 
grants linked to standardise collection efficiency worked out as indicated above.  It is 
also possible to design graded incentives.  For example, the panchayats with 50-75 
per cent collection efficiency can be given one rupee grant for every additional rupee 
collected above 50 per cent collection efficiency.  Those above 75 per cent collection 
efficiency can be given grant at higher rates, (say Rs. 1.50) for every additional rupee 
collected above 75 per cent collection efficiency.  This can substantially augment 
resources for  local public services in rural areas to ensure greater adequacy, 
efficiency, and accountability in local public service delivery. 
 
(vi)  Contrary to general impression,  interesting examples of people voluntarily 
paying for public services is when they are faced with the acute problem of getting a 
basic requirement, like drinking water.   Several of the  panchayats have taken 
initiatives to approach various agencies including the state governments and   32 
 
multilateral lenders, put in efforts to collect contributions from the villagers and have 
created economically sustainable systems of water supply including metered supply 
and proper pricing. An important lesson that comes out in the case studies presented 
in the earlier section is that the people are willing to work together and willingly make 
payments. In fact, one can also see inter-panchayat cooperation and coordination as 
seen in the case of Sanur village, which not only supplies water to the households in 
the village, but  also in the neighbouring villages of Nitte and Miyyaru as well as parts 
of  Kerala municipality.    These case studies show that people would not only  be 
willing to pay for the essential services such as water supply but would also ensure 
proper maintenance of the water supply system to ensure regular supply. 
 
  Some of the cases reviewed bring out the difficulties of village panchayats in 
providing the service even as the village community is willing to pay for it.  The first 
and foremost is lack of information for the village panchayats on the existing sources 
of financing water supply schemes, and their  lack of capacity to access the 
appropriate technology.  Even when a state like Karnataka has a water supply and 
sanitation scheme, the panchayats do not have the information to access funds for 
the purpose.  Second, some of the cases bring out the lack of sensitivity on the part 
of the  state bureaucracy to the concerns of  panchayats.  The case study of 
Shiruguppi described earlier shows that the  panchayat representatives had to 
undertake a hunger strike to persuade the state bureaucracy to provide the 
incremental finance needed to complete the water supply scheme taken up under the 
World Bank assistance.
8   
 
(vii)   A recent example of advancing decentralisation effectively to rural local 
governments is in the case of Bihar, when confronted with large scale absenteeism in 
schools, which decentralised the powers to appoint teachers Shiksha Karmis   and 
health workers at the district level.  Since 2000,  the  Government of Bihar has 
entrusted a greater role to the panchayats in the decisions relating to the elementary 
education sector.  The three important decisions in this regard  include the constitution 
of Vidyalaya Shiksha Samitis to oversee the functioning of schools, appointment of a 
Shikha Mitra (para-teacher) in every primary school in rural areas of the state and 
adoption of education guarantee scheme with a clear role for PRIs at different levels 
of management.   In 2006, the post of Shiksha Mitra which was a temporary position 
with a consolidated pay of Rs. 1500 appointed for 11 months was converted into a 
permanent position of Panchayat Shikshak superannuating at 60 years of age and 
with a salary of Rs. 4000 per month. The PRIs have been empowered to appoint 
these  teachers. Primary teachers would be appointed at the  panchayat, middle 
teachers at the block and secondary and senior secondary teachers at the district 
level by gram panchayats, panchayat samitis and zila parishads respectively for the 
rural areas. The appointments in the urban areas will be made by the urban civic 
bodies.  Fifty per cent of the new recruits at the primary level would be women and 
three per cent of the jobs would be reserved for physically-challenged persons.   
 
  The empowerment of the panchayats to appoint teachers seems to have 
brought about a significant improvement in the education landscape of Bihar.  The 
surveys by Pratham show that teacher absenteeism has shown a sharp decline and 
the educational outcome in terms of students’ ability to read and comprehend and do 
                                                  
8 There is a larger issue of the state’s inability to prevent pollution in the Krishna River which is 
a source of livelihood for several villages.         
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simple arithmetic has substantially improved.  The surveys have also pointed out the 
need to develop the capacity of the newly appointed teachers.   
 
(viii)  Creating institutions and systems to share and learn from the experiences of 
one another can be an important way in which the village panchayats can build their 
capacity to meet various developmental challenges.  At present, there are no formal 
or informal forums in which they can share their experiences and learn from one 
another.  When the  panchayats are confronted with difficulties in carrying out a 
developmental project, for example, they do not have a body from which they can 
seek advice to solve their problems.  The experience of Shiruguppi village panchayat 
in Karnataka noted in the previous section shows that the even as the village 
panchayat members were advised by the Abdul Nazeer Sab Institute, the state 
bureaucracy was not very helpful.  The experiences of the panchayats recorded in 
the previous section also shows that there are many village panchayats that have met 
with their developmental challenges in ingenious ways, and a platform for sharing 
these experiences could be extremely useful to make the village panchayats play the 
role of catalyst in development.  In fact, horizontal learning has greater impact than 
advi ce given from above because this clearly demonstrates what other panchayats 
have succeeded in implementating.  Therefore,  lessons drawn from  the  actual 
experiences of panchayats provide confidence to similar  panchayats for adopting 
them.  
 
  Dissemination of information can lead to demand for specialised services 
which the village  panchayats should be able to avail.  To begin with the state 
governments should provide this advisory service and eventually, these can become 
independent centres charging for their services and the village panchayats can avail 
these services by contracting them.  There must also be an institutional mechanism 
to encourage interactions among village panchayats and foster cooperation among 
them.  
 
  Wide dissemination of the information on the experiences of panchayats will 
be helpful in raising the awareness of the people as well.  As  discussed earlier, 
according to Salmon (1987), voters benchmark the performances of panchayats with 
most efficient service delivery and pressurise their own panchayat to improve their 
services comparable to the benchmark.   This, however, presumes that information is 
costless and free and is readily available.  Unfortunately, no mechanism exists in any 
state to make the information readily and freely available to enable horizontal learning.  
In fact, there is considerable incentive not to make the information available because 
that will put pressure on the panchayat leadership to perform better.  It is here that 
both the state government and NGOs have to play an important role in disseminating 
information and lessons of experience of other  panchayats in dealing with major 
developmental issues and the information on the agencies the village panchayats 
should approach to solve financing and implementing issues relating to 
developmental projects they intend to implement. 
 
(ix)   An important precondition  for implementing grassroots planning is the 
availability of demographic, geographical, and economic information at the village 
panchayat level.  It is also important to have information on  design and 
implementation aspects of  various central and state schemes and programmes 
implemented  at the village  panchayat  level so that the  panchayats can take 
advantage of the schemes in the most efficient manner.  The report of the committee 
on grassroots planning has emphasised the need to collect information for the 
formulation and implementation of the development plans and the importance of   34 
 
having a proper information system cannot be overemphasised.  The information on 
the land holdings and various properties are important to design a simple area based 
property tax system and information  on the common property resources can be 
helpful in ensuring that these are used by the community properly. 
 
  The above discussion shows that decentralisation to rural local governments 
can work as catalysts in development, if both design and implementation aspects are 
ensured to create an appropriate incentive structure.  The paper has pointed out 
some of the major shortcomings in the prevailing system of decentralisation and has 
identified the reform areas.  The most important issue to be realised is that the policy 
makers must have confidence in the ability of the village panchayats to carry on the 
developmental mandate.  This is not an option but an imperative, for there is no other 
way to deal with inclusive growth.  In fact, if local governments have not delivered, the 
blame lies squarely with both central and even more, state governments, because 
they never reposed confidence in the  panchayats, did not create enabling 
environment for the panchayats to function well, and never fully empowered them.  
The preceding discussion underlines the areas where reforms have to be undertaken 
to empower  panchayats to be the catalysts in development and increase 
opportunities and freedom of the people, particularly those of the disadvantaged 
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